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Social Security Privatization and the Fiscal Gap
DANIEL SHAvIRo*
Social Security privatization is a package whose main components are offering
portfolio choice, prospectively eliminating transfers within the system, and
changing the program's official language to one of "individual accounts" rather
than a collective "trust fund." The language change is aimed at jawboning
Congress into regarding Social Security's financing as more off-limits when it
makes other tax and spending decisions. All three changes are debatable, and
while the language change might modestly help in addressing the $44 trillion
fiscal gap that, within the next twenty years, is likely to cause serious disruption
to our economy and political system, more direct action to narrow the fiscal gap
might be preferable.
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article makes two main points. First, the question of whether we should
"privatize" Social Security is poorly posed. Privatization proposals actually are
packages of multiple proposed changes to Social Security, relating to (1) portfolio
choice by participants with respect to their benefits, (2) transfers within Social
Security between participants, and (3) how the system is officially described. A
better-posed set of questions would therefore address separately each of the items
in the privatization package. No one should feel compelled to give a single up-or-
down verdict on all three of them.
Second, one important motivation for privatization might be to facilitate, as a
political matter, introducing and retaining greater pre-funding of the system's
long-term obligations. This, in turn, might be lauded as (1) making Social
Security, or current government policy generally, more sustainable, (2) adjusting
our fiscal policy to be more favorable towards future generations, and
(3) generating an increase in national saving. However, whether privatization
would accomplish any of these aims depends on how it is done, and on
Congress's unpredictable response over the long term to changing how Social
Security is officially described. Moreover, even if any such effects are realized,
they are likely to be swamped by the opposite effects of the tax cuts that Congress
passed in 2001 and again in 2003.
II. CURRENT SOCIAL SECURITY
As I discussed in my book, Making Sense of Social Security Reform, Social
Security is best conceptualized as a three-part program. 1 First, it seeks to induce
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lifetime consumption smoothing or forced saving by participants. 2 Second, it
denies participants portfolio choice with respect to their forced saving within the
system.3 Third, it transfers wealth in various ways between participants. 4 Social
Security has other relevant features as well, such as those concerning how it is
administered and how the government officially describes it, but those features
are secondary.
A. Forced Saving or Consumption Smoothing
Social Security imposes taxes on workers and then offers them benefits once
they have reached the applicable retirement age.5 The effect on a given worker, if
she does not reverse it through other decisions, is to require her to save a portion
of her lifetime income, net of taxes and transfers, for retirement. Workers may
respond by saving less outside Social Security than they otherwise would have.
They generally do not, however, actually negate the forced saving, such as by
borrowing in advance against the benefits' expected value.6 Social Security,
therefore, effectively sets a floor on one's retirement saving given one's lifetime
income net of taxes and transfers. 7
In Making Sense of Social Security Reform, I called this system feature
"forced saving."'8 As I noted, however, this term risked inviting the mistaken
conclusion that Social Security actually increases, or at least does not reduce,
national saving.9 After all, if everyone is being forced to save, then seemingly the
country as a whole is being forced to save. This is not the case, however, and
there is strong (though controversial) empirical evidence that Social Security has
actually reduced national saving over time.10
The joker in the deck that permits this result is Social Security's requiring
people to save a portion of their lifetime income, net of taxes and transfers. As a
result, one's forced saving may consist simply of the transfer from future workers
that one is saving in the sense of not yet consuming its present value. No one
2Id. at 29-31.
3 Id. at 67-69.
4 Id. at 69-73.
5 See id. at 13.
6Id. at 66-67.
7 Medicare adds to this floor. For a full discussion of Medicare reform issues, similar to
my analysis of Social Security reform in SHAWiRo, supra note 1, see generally DANIEL
SHAVIRO, WHO SHOULD PAY FOR MEDICARE? (forthcoming Mar. 2004).
8 See SHAVIRO, supra note 1, at 29.
9 See id. at 30.
10 See id. at 67.
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needs to be setting aside any current resources in order for this forced saving to
occur.
To illustrate, suppose the government awards me a $10 million zero-coupon
bond, to be paid in 2030 but subject to restrictions that effectively prevent me
from borrowing in advance against its accruing value. Suppose further that the
government finances the bond through a uniform head tax, to be levied in 2030 on
all persons who were born in 2005. This is "forced saving" by me, but if anything
it will probably induce me to consume more today, given how it helps pay for my
retirement. The people who will end up financing it cannot yet save, and even
their parents may be unlikely to respond very much or indeed at all. Hence, the
"forced saving" by me implies reduced, rather than increased, societal saving.
Why might we favor a forced consumption-smoothing (or forced saving)
program? The key reason is paternalism with a dollop of externalities. It seems
indisputable that people generally ought, in their own self-interest, to save at least
some minimum portion of their lifetime income for retirement. They do not
always do so, however, and there are psychological theories, grounded in myopia
and self-control problems, that plausibly explain low retirement saving as a failure
in optimization rather than as a reflection of a stable preference for sooner
consumption." 1 Thus, forced consumption smoothing plausibly may improve
people's welfare on balance, even where it denies them the choice they would
otherwise have made.
The externalities version of this explanation rests on noting that people who
enter retirement with inadequate savings are likely to get financial support from
others who feel compelled to alleviate their distress. Hence, by requiring them to
save for their own retirement, we can prevent them from imposing these costs on
us. This rationale does not apply, however, if Social Security ends up increasing
the transfers that we make to them.
B. Denial of Porfolio Choice Within Social Security
Social Security offers a fixed, real life annuity, the value of which depends on
one's thirty-five best years of earnings up to the Social Security tax ceiling.12
Benefits are indexed to wage growth up to the point when one begins to draw
benefits and, afterwards, to inflation. 13 The system does not, however, permit one
to exercise portfolio choice with respect to benefit accrual. 14 Thus, for example,
I1 See, e.g., David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J. ECON.
443, 443 (1997) (theorizing that financial commitment opportunities are a valuable means of
overcoming problems of self-control).
12 See SHAVIRO, supra note 1, at 13.
13 See id. at 13-14.
14 See id. at 67-68.
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you cannot elect to have the value of your retirement benefits depend on the
performance of the stock market or of particular stock or bond funds.
The rationale for denying portfolio choice with respect to Social Security
benefits is the same as that for forced consumption smoothing. People arguably
ought to have a relatively safe investment of this kind in their portfolios to avoid
the downside of entering retirement with too little saved. Left to their own
devices, however, they might make poor choices, either out of irrationality,
ignorance or in the expectation that others will rescue them in the event of a bad
outcome. The system, therefore, limits choice on paternalist grounds or to address
externalities.
C. Transfers Within Social Security
Social Security's biggest transfer is from younger to older generations. It also
is somewhat progressive because, while high-earners get the most under the
benefit formula and also tend to live the longest, this does not fully make up for
their paying higher payroll taxes. 15 In addition, Social Security favors one-earner
married couples relative to single individuals and two-earner couples because
one-earner couples qualify for spousal benefits without having to pay for the extra
coverage. 16
Transfers through Social Security are relatively non-transparent. People are
not told how their expected benefits at retirement compare to their tax payments,
and the system was structured to make benefits look-often misleadingly-like a
mere return of taxes paid. One rationale for this misleading structure is that it
provides political cover for poverty relief by stapling it to a popular middle-class
entitlement program. However, any such political cover comes at a high cost
since it tends to shield from scrutiny the transfers to groups, such as current
seniors and one-earner couples, that are not necessarily among the neediest.
Such political considerations aside, there generally are not strong reasons for
using Social Security as an instrument of lifetime redistribution, other than that
from shorter-lived individuals to longer-lived individuals. (The latter get more out
of a lifetime annuity, thus redistributing from the worse-off to the better-off (if we
would rather live longer), but appropriately so given the greater lifetime needs of
a longer-lived individual.) In the case of a high-eamer and low-earner with the
same lifespan, one might well ask why we would use retirement annuities, which
mainly serve forced saving purposes, for redistribution as well. One answer might
be that we have better lifetime (as opposed to merely annual) information about
15 See id at 69-71.
16 See id. at 72-73.
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their earnings at retirement than previously. 17 Insofar as this is the motive for
progressive redistribution through Social Security, however, it might be desirable
if the low-earner could borrow in advance against the extra redistributive portion
of her Social Security benefits, since only administrative or measurement reasons
underlie making her wait for it. A second possible reason for reserving some
progressive redistribution for Social Security would be that work incentives are
no longer distorted once one has definitively retired. Here, however, we must also
consider the high labor supply elasticity of the younger elderly as they
contemplate retirement and the effect on a current worker's labor supply and
saving decisions if she anticipates extra progressive redistribution (based on her
wealth at the time or her lifetime earnings) once she has retired.
Social Security's inter-generational redistribution is not only larger, but also
politically more fundamental to it than is its progressivity. A principal reason for
its enactment in 1935 was to give money to contemporary retirees, some of whom
the Great Depression had left in poverty. 18 Subsequent expansions reflected the
political power of the elderly, along with the widely held view that seniors ought
to share in the bounty as society grew richer. More generally, insofar as one
favors inter-generational redistribution, retirement programs are a convenient
place to do a lot of redistribution. Insofar as one fears the political power of the
elderly to demand excessive transfers, retirement programs are the most important
place in which to cut back.
D. Other Features of Social Security
Social Security has low administrative costs given the amount of money that
flows through the system. But, this reflects the low level of customer service that
its fixed structure makes feasible. The offering of portfolio choice inevitably
would raise the costs of running it and probably would require outsourcing
various administrative functions from the Social Security Administration to
private finns.
Current net revenues from operating the system are officially credited to the
Social Security Trust Fund, which is a legally mandated set of bookkeeping
entries maintained by the Treasury Department to help keep track of the system's
fiscal performance over time. 19 A given year's Social Security surplus (since
annual deficits within the system remain more than a decade in the future) is
included in, and thus reduces, the official "unified" budget deficit but not the
official "on-budget" deficit. Many commentators believe that one or the other of
17 See generally JEFFREY B. LIEBMAN, SHOULD TAXES BE BASED ON LIFETIME INCOME?
VICKREY TAXATION REvIsITED, at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/jeffreyliebmani
LiebmanLLTAX.v 1.pdf (July, 2002).
18e SHAVIRo, supra note 1, at 20.
19 See id. at 76.
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these two measures, whether or not it has any direct economic significance,
influences congressional behavior.20 An annual budget surplus of the relevant
kind ostensibly invites Congress to cut taxes or increase spending, although it has
the power to do either or both of these whether there is a budget surplus or not.
Despite Social Security's current operating surplus, it is mainly a pay-as-you-
go, rather than a pre-funded, system. The amounts needed to meet future
liabilities are not set aside in advance. Were Social Security a privately operated
system, this would likely lead down the road to default on its obligations. Given
the government's power to raise taxes, however, the lack of pre-funding has no
such automatic significance here. Instead, the extent to which Social Security
obligations are ultimately honored depends on future discretionary political
decisions in light of the overall sustainability of the fiscal path that the
government sets for itself. The main significance of pre-funding, therefore, lies
elsewhere, as I discuss in Part IV below.
III. PRIVATIZATION
The core of the privatization idea is that Social Security participants would
have their own individual accounts funded (at least once the system was fully
phased in) by their own wage contributions. A participant would then have some
discretion regarding how her account was invested. For example, she might be
able to choose between a number of diversified stock and bond funds, perhaps
with a required ratio (or range of permissible ratios) between stock and bond
holdings. The value of the fixed real life annuity (and any other permitted
benefits, such as inheritability if she died young) would depend on the amount in
her account at retirement.
Privatization apparently derives its name from the administrative outsourcing
to private firms that the offering of portfolio choice might, as a practical matter,
necessitate.21 This outsourcing, however, is a relatively trivial feature of the
proposed package of changes. Those of greater significance are (1) offering
portfolio choice, (2) possibly eliminating certain transfers within Social Security,
and (3) changing certain conventions that the government uses in its official
descriptions of the program.
A. Portfolio Choice in a Privatized System
Anyone who believes that people often have the best information regarding
their preferences and the best incentive to pursue their own interests ought to
consider the possibility that Social Security could be improved by offering
enrollees some portfolio choice. While paternalist and externality concerns clearly
20 See id. at 150.
21 See id. at 127.
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limit the range of choice that is likely to be desirable, they do not necessarily
require operating a one-size-fits-all system in which no "bet" on the performance
of the stock or bond markets is permitted with respect to one's accruing benefits.
The big problem with this sort of structure, even if one generally likes
consumer choice, is that it would raise the system's administrative costs. These
costs would be especially significant, relative to the value of offering portfolio
choice in Social Security, for the small-sized accounts that most workers would
have. Commentators disagree both about the magnitude of these costs and about
whether any significant collateral benefits, such as encouraging more people to
become informed investors and/or to feel more like economic stakeholders,
would be realized. 22
During the stock market boom (and Internet bubble) of the late 1990s, two
additional (but bogus) considerations seemed to support allowing workers to
invest in the stock market through Social Security. The first was that stocks
appeared to be an incredibly good investment, supposedly guaranteed to continue
rising indefinitely by 10% or more per year. We now know better. Second, many
were too quick to conclude that people who do not own stock must have under-
diversified portfolios. The problem with this view was that it overlooked the
implicit financial stake that all prospective Social Security beneficiaries have in
the stock market-or, more precisely, in the same set of economic variables as
those that control the long-term performance of the stock market-through the
fiscal system and their own direct stakes in the United States macro-economy. 23
Real diversification for most Americans, therefore, would involve "shorting" the
United States economy to go long in the world economy, as the economist Robert
Shiller has suggested, 24 rather than directly owning stock in United States
companies.
The alarming performance of the stock market in the early 2000s has
probably killed most of the political appeal of portfolio choice within Social
Security. As I noted during the boom, however, the resolution of this design issue
really ought not to depend on such short-term considerations.25 If portfolio choice
within Social Security is a bad idea, then it is due to the paternalist grounds for
limiting choice plus the administrative costs of managing small accounts.
B. Eliminating Transfers Within Social Security
Privatization would eliminate all transfers within Social Security if the value
of one's benefits depended purely on the accrued value of an account that had
22 See id at 137-42.
23 See SHAvRo, supra note 1, at 115.
24 See generally ROBERT J. SHILLER, MACRO MARKETS: CREATING INsTITUTIONS FOR
MANAGING SOCIETY'S LARGEST ECONOMIC RISKS 6-9 (1993).
25 See SHAvIRo, supra note 1, at 116.
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been funded solely through one's own wage contributions.26 Prominent versions
of privatization would indeed have this character once they were fully phased in,
although it is not an inevitable consequence of using individual accounts. In
principle, one could easily modify privatization to include such redistributive
features as government transfers to low-earners' accounts and/or taxes on high-
earners' accounts. These taxes and transfers could depend on participants' annual
or career earnings or on the amounts in their accounts at retirement (reflecting
investment performance). 27
A truly non-redistributive privatized system would eliminate the dominant
transfer within Social Security to date, which is that from younger to older
generations. However, no prominent privatization proposal to date has targeted
the benefits of current seniors or even older current workers. The approach, rather
(for reasons of understandable political prudence) has been to guarantee existing
benefits while switching gradually to the new ones, at least initially just when the
initial benefits are the greater.
Some versions of privatization might even increase the transfer from future
generations to current workers. Suppose that, during the transition to privatization,
all contributions to people's individual accounts came from the government. This
might be done, for example, on the view that existing payroll taxes are needed to
pay off current law benefits, and that increasing mandated wage contributions (in
effect, by increasing the payroll tax) would be undesirable or politically
unfeasible. Suppose further that the government contributions led to increased
benefits for current workers and were financed through debt that was repaid by
future generations. Under this scenario, privatization would end up increasing
transfers from future generations to current workers, even if it eliminated further
inter-generational transfers once it was fully phased in.
Evidently then, the main transfer through Social Security that privatization
would target is that from high-earners to low-earners. Its adoption would reduce
the overall progressivity of the fiscal system unless offset by other changes, such
as to the income tax or welfare rules. To some privatization proponents, one
suspects that this is actually more of the point than they are publicly prepared to
admit. Whether it is a problem, however, even if one favors at least the current
level of progressivity, depends on whether one should expect offsetting changes
elsewhere, either immediately or down the road. Any such offsetting changes are
highly unlikely to accompany any privatization package that emerges from the
Bush Administration. However, it is less clear whether (and, if so, how)
26 More precisely, this would eliminate all transfers within Social Security if one
computed benefits in terms of expected value at retirement and ignored the problem of dying
before retirement. A fixed real life annuity ends up transferring resources expost from the short-
lived to the long-lived, even if it is actuarially fair ex ante.
27 See SHAVIRO, supra note 1, at 153-55.
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eliminating Social Security's progressivity would affect the long-term political
equilibrium regarding wealth redistribution.
As I noted in Making Sense of Social Security Reform, progressive
privatization, or that which included transfers from high-earners' to low-earners'
accounts, might have an important political economy advantage over the current
system. It would tend to make Social Security transfers more transparent, and
perhaps more coherent, than they presently are.28 For example, the current
system's bias in favor of one-earner married couples might be more visible in an
individual account system, potentially encouraging a sensible requirement that the
non-working spouse's benefits be paid for through greater tax contributions by
one-earner couples.29 Those who dislike transparency, on the ground that
obfuscation permits greater progressivity, may be mistaken as to its political
effects. Social Security's political sanctity, founded on the false notion that it
offers only fully earned benefits, aids it in competing for scarce government
resources with programs whose constituencies may be considerably less well-
heeled than the seniors who get the bulk of its benefits.
C. Changing the Official Description of Social Security
Privatization's use of individual accounts would also be a change in how the
system is officially described. Wage contributions that were used to fund benefits,
instead of being described as taxes that swelled the Social Security Trust Fund
and reduced the unified budget deficit, would be described as belonging to
individuals through their Social Security accounts. Less would actually have
changed than the language suggests. Even with a collective trust fund, people
have strong expectations of receiving the benefits that the current law promises.
Even with individual accounts, people's ability to access the funds would depend
on what Congress subsequently decided to permit.
While the language change might make people's benefit expectations more
secure, this would not be the main reason for it. The main aim, rather, is to change
Congress's thinking in the hope of making pre-funding, and greater fiscal restraint
across the board, more politically feasible. Commentators have long recognized
that pre-funding is more problematic in a government-provided plan than in a
private retirement plan, because the government's strength (its power to change
the laws at any time) is, in a sense, its weakness. Credible and sustainable pre-
commitment is harder for it than for private firms that can put accumulating funds
beyond their legal reach, such as through escrow and trust arrangements. A
burgeoning Social Security surplus, therefore-even though it is officially
excluded from the on-budget deficit measure-might be viewed by Congress as
28 See id. at 150-54.
29 See id. at 153.
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just so much available boodle for it to shower on favored constituents and
programs.
Even with a collective trust fund, one can try to address this problem in
various ways. President Clinton used the phrase "saving Social Security" to
denote avoiding tax cuts and spending increases that would reduce the unified
budget surplus to less than the Social Security surplus. 30 The supposed budgetary
"lockbox" that was in vogue during the 2000 Presidential campaign and then
remained so until September 11, 2001 connoted the same idea, with a portion of
Medicare added to the mix. These constraints evaporated on that day, however,
for no reason that (beyond the short term) made any sense whatsoever. The costs
of fighting terrorism indicated that the long-term fiscal picture might be worse
than we had previously thought, not better, thus calling for greater fiscal
discipline, not less.
Enter privatization, supposedly to the rescue. Under its descriptive
conventions, money that went into and out of the system would no longer be
described as going to or coming from the government. Assuming an annual
Social Security surplus, the annual budget deficit would now look greater (or
more specifically, the on-budget surplus would look more like the true one).
Moreover, Social Security pre-funding that accumulated over time would
ostensibly look more off-limits to future Administrations and Congresses.
How much should we credit this little story? On the one hand, we have
recently seen just how frail the "lockbox" metaphor proved to be under the
current set of descriptions. On the other hand, we are also learning anew just how
completely an Administration and Congress can scorn the goal of long-term fiscal
sustainability. Might they be more reckless still if Social Security were not
looming as a long-term problem-wholly without regard to whether it was
reported as governmental or non-governmental?
For a number of different reasons, it is hard to have much confidence in the
power of nomenclature changes to constrain future fiscal decisions by the
government. Mere language conventions can always be ignored. The underlying
realities that the conventions do not change may have some influence (even if
slight) no matter what. And the language choices do not alter the fundamental set
of opportunities that Congress and the President face at any time. It used to be
argued, for example, that a budget surplus is dangerous because, if the money is
there, then Congress will spend it.31 But the report of a surplus has no effect on
what can actually be spent. Congress has the power to enact whatever tax and
spending changes it likes, with the level of public debt adjusting for any gap
between the two.32 The effect of the surplus, therefore (itself merely the product
30 See id at 93.
31 See id. at 150.
32 At some point, if Congress took this to the limit, it would find that the government
could no longer borrow, or even print, money that would be treated as valuable in global credit
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of a set of fiscal language conventions), is purely hortatory. It has no bearing on
what money is actually "there" to be spent.
Perhaps the greatest potential advantage of the language change would be its
facilitating the enactment of a tax increase. Extra withholding from people's
paychecks that was described as funding their individual accounts might be easier
to sell politically than if it were described as going to the collective Social
Security Trust Fund. Unfortunately, however, any moves towards privatization in
the next few years are unlikely to take this form. Better (from a crass political
standpoint) to make the supposed contributions pain-free by having them come
from the govemment, which can simply borrow the money and describe the
budget deficit as greater. The net effect of the accounts, if they raised expectations
as to future promised benefits, might actually be to worsen rather than improve
our long-term fiscal posture.
Even if the tax increase version of privatization were possible, however, any
benefit would be outweighed by the countervailing effect of the enormous tax
cuts that Congress enacted in 2001 and again in 2003. Accordingly, those who
favor privatization as a device for achieving a more responsible long-term fiscal
policy, and yet who did not oppose the tax cuts, gave new meaning to the
expression "penny-wise and pound-foolish." I show this next by discussing the
overall United States fiscal gap.
IV. PRIVATIZATION AND THE OVERALL UNITED STATES FISCAL GAP
Social Security is merely a part of the broader United States fiscal system.
The historical reason for calling it a separate entity with its own dedicated
financing was simply to create a political pre-commitment device. As President
Franklin Roosevelt said when the program was first enacted, "[w]ith those
[dedicated payroll] taxes in there, no damn politician can ever scrap my social
security program." 33 Despite Social Security's ostensibly separate structure,
however, it undoubtedly is subject to the broader vicissitudes of the United States
fiscal system as a whole. For example, any shortfall in Social Security would
undoubtedly be made good through the use of general revenues if they otherwise
exceeded planned spending. Likewise, over-fumding of Social Security might
induce budgetary spillover of some kind (as reflected in concerns about the
"lockbox"). The overall fiscal picture is therefore what really matters; as the late
economist Robert Eisner used to say, it all goes "into the same stomach."'34
Suppose for the moment, however, that Social Security were a stand-alone
system, completely insulated from other taxes and spending. Why would we care
markets. But, we are far from that point, and the effect of a given budget surplus on its
proximity is too trivial to be worth considering.
33 See SHAVIRO, supra note 1, at 90.
3 4 ROBERT EISNER, THE MISUNDERSTOOD ECONOMY 133 (1994).
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about the adequacy of its pre-funding, given that the United States government's
ability to raise taxes and print money shields it from most of the default risk of an
unfunded private retirement system? The main reasons are as follows:
(1) A long-term shortfall would indicate that Social Security was not
currently on a sustainable course. At some point, then, its taxes would have to be
increased and/or its benefits cut. The failure to place the system on a sustainable
course, or to explain how the shortfall would ultimately be made up, would create
needless planning uncertainty for people who wanted to know what to expect
from it down the road. Those who failed to understand that the present course is
unsustainable might make systematic errors, such as planning for future benefits
that were unlikely to materialize in full. In Washington's charged political
environment, there would also be a significant chance that ignoring the problem
until it reached crisis proportions would lead to panicky, ill-considered responses
at the last minute.35
(2) The failure to provide adequate funding would favor current generations
at the expense of future generations, by leaving a large unfunded liability for the
latter to meet.36
(3) The failure to set aside funds would tend to reduce national saving, for the
reasons described in my earlier example concerning the $10 million zero-coupon
bond.37 Making large transfers from future to current generations has an income
effect on the latter, encouraging them to spend more on consumption.38 The
members of future generations cannot respond by consuming less when they have
not yet been born. A tax increase devoted to funding future benefits reduces the
funds available for people to spend today, and, if it is really being set aside, then
government spending for current consumption does not increase either.
Broadening our perspective to reflect that Social Security is part of the larger
United States fiscal system does not change these concerns. It merely widens the
set of taxes and spending programs that we must look at when determining the
extent to which our current long-term policy path is under-funded. To this end,
economists have recently developed a measure called the fiscal gap (or fiscal
imbalance), measuring the size of the long-run tax increase and/or spending cut
that would be needed to put our long-term fiscal policy on a sustainable course.
One recent estimate puts the current fiscal gap at $44 trillion, or about four
times our annual gross domestic product (GDP).39 Another recent estimate,
35 See Daniel N. Shaviro, The Growing US. Fiscal Gap, 3 WORLD ECON. J. 1, 5-6
(2002).
36 See SHAviRO, supra note 7, at 100.
37 See supra Part lI.A.
38e SHAVIRO, supra note 1, at 86.
3 9 JAGADEESH GOKHALE & KENT SMElTERS, FIsCAL AND GENERATIONAL IMBALANCE:
NEW BUDGET MEASURES FOR NEW BUDGET PRIORITIES 2 (2003).
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predicting the 2003 enactments, puts it at 11.07% of GDP,40 or $74 trillion .if we
assume that real GDP will grow at 1.5% annually (its average in the United States
since the end of World War II) and that the real interest rate is 3% (as in the
United States government's official long-term Medicare forecasts).41 One- key
reason for the difference between these two forecasts is that the higher one is
based on assuming that the 2001 Tax Act will be retained indefinitely rather than
expiring after 2010 (as current law provides),42 and that reform of the alternative
minimum tax to prevent it from applying to ever-more taxpayers will be
politically necessary. These are eminently plausible adjustments to the law on the
books in projecting our current policy course.
These estimates are admittedly (and, given their long-term -nature,
necessarily) both speculative and subject to considerable change. As unbiased
forecasts, however, they could just as easily go up as down. They also are, to a
significant degree, growth-proof. Over the long run, Social Security benefits are
roughly pegged to the growth of the economy via the wage indexing in the benefit
formula. Moreover, Medicare is pegged to the size of the healthcare sector, which
for -years has been growing faster than GDP.43 Congress's appetite for
discretionary spending may also tend to grow with the economy, Which
determines tax revenues and the level of available resources. And the two main
causes of the fiscal gap, increasing life expectancy and ever-improving (but
costlier) healthcare technology, appear to be stable trends. 44
What does it mean to have a fiscal gap of $44 trillion or $74 trillion? It is
similar to owing that amount as public debt (which in April 2003 stood at only
$6.5 trillion), except that the commitment is not quite as fixed and thus can be
lowered without an explicit act of default. In the case of Social Security and
Medicare, however, which are responsible for most of the fiscal gap, our
commitments under present law are viewed by many as scarcely less inviolate
than the government's commitment to honor its explicit debts.
Current GDP is about $11 trillion.45 Thus, in order to eliminate the fiscal gap,
we would have to set aside (through tax increases or spending cuts) a set of cash
flows with the same present value as paying today an amount that (depending on
which estimate one uses) is more than four times, or more than seven times as
40 Alan J. Auerbach, William G. Gale & Peter R. Orszag, The Budget Outlook and
Options for Fiscal Policy, 95 TAx NOTES 1639, 1644 (2002).
41 Shaviro, supra note 35, at 2.
42 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38
(2001).
43 See SHAvIRO, supra note 7, at 6.
44 Shaviro, supra note 35, at 4.
45 See U.S. DEP'T OF COM., BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, NEWS RELEASE: GROSS
DoMEsTIc PRODUCT AND CORPORATE PROFITS, at http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/
newsrel/gdpnewsrelease.htm (Jan. 30, 2004).
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great as our society's entire economic production over a year. This obviously far
exceeds what is either politically or practically feasible.
It should be clear, therefore, that our current fiscal policy is under-funded and
unsustainable. It will have to change whether we want to change it or not; and,
when it does, many people will be disappointed. Might Social Security
privatization help in addressing the problem if it aids the enactment of a tax
increase and discourages Congress from treating the added revenues as so much
more boodle for it to distribute? Perhaps it could. But is Social Security
privatization, with all the collateral issues that it raises concerning portfolio
choice, retirement security, and distributional policy, a well-chosen political tool
for beginning to address the fiscal gap? That appears considerably more doubtful.
Consider, for example, that the 2001 Tax Act-lauded by many supporters of
privatization-has been estimated, if made permanent, to increase the fiscal gap
by $13 trillion.46 Privatization would have to increase net revenues by 1.9% of
GDP (or nearly $200 billion per year at the start, pegged to the economy) merely
to offset this effect of the 2001 Act, without even beginning to reach the
preexisting Social Security and Medicare shortfalls.
V. CONCLUSION
Social Security privatization is a package, rather than a unitary proposal. Its
main components are (1) offering portfolio choice with respect to Social Security
benefits, (2) eliminating transfers within the system from high-earners to low-
earners, and (3) changing official descriptions of the program to use the language
of individual accounts rather than of a collective trust fund. The last of these
changes is aimed at permitting the system to be pre-funded without as great a
likelihood that Congress would simply dissipate the extra funds.
The merits of the first two of these changes are debatable. Consumer choice,
including portfolio choice by investors, is often a good thing. But one of Social
Security's key purposes is to limit people's choices, concerning both when they
consume and how they invest, as a paternalist measure to ensure their retirement
security. While this purpose does not rule out offering Social Security participants
some portfolio choice, the cost-effectiveness of offering such choice is in dispute.
Eliminating progressive redistribution through Social Security has no obvious
appeal, unless one thinks that the fiscal system as a whole is currently too
progressive. Simply shifting the redistribution to other fiscal instruments, such as
the income tax and various transfer programs, might be unobjectionable, but,
under the current Bush Administration, there is little prospect of this happening.
Privatization appears unlikely to address Social Security's enormous, and in some
views excessive, transfers from younger to older generations.
46 Shaviro, supra note 35, at 3.
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Privatization's re-casting of the Social Security system in terms of individual
accounts, rather than a collective trust fund, is more language than substance. It
might modestly aid efforts to increase the system's pre-funding, which, if not
offset by other tax cuts or spending increases, would be a step toward addressing
the overall United States fiscal gap. However, directly addressing the fiscal gap
would be a lot more constructive than relying on privatization, which raises so
many extraneous issues (and hackles) while offering so little aid other than the
purely semantic.

